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ABSTRACT
Links between disturbances in financialmarkets and those in real
activity have long been the focus of studies of economicfluctuations during
the period prior to World War I. Weemphasize that domestic autonomy was
substantially limited by internationally integrated markets forgoods and
capital. Such findings are important forstudying business cycles during the
period; for example, when prices are flexible, observedcyclical movements can be related to a credit—market transmission ofdeflationary shocks.
Recent studies of the classical gold standardhave revived interest in
the process by which macroeconomic shockswere transmitted internationally
during this period. The principal competingapproaches —the"price—specie— flow," mechanism and the more modern "internationalist"view —differ
according to the means by which international equilibrium isreestablished
after a disturbance occurs in capital,money, or commodity markets. We
present and interpret separate pieces of evidence ongold flows, interest
rates, and selected commodity prices, all of which shedlight on the
alternative assumptions employed in theprice—specie—flow and modern
approaches. We employ a monthly data set for the U.S. andBritain for the
pre—World War I frameworks. Using the "structural VAR"approach of Bernanke
and Sims, we compare the actual historicalimportance of shocks and the
observed patterns of short—run adjustment to shockswith the prediction of
each of the two models. The evidencesupports the "internationalist" view of
close international linkages over the "specie—flow"view of circuitous
linkages and domestic autonomy in money and capital markets.
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Linksbetween disturbances in financial markets and those in real
activity have long been the focus of studies of economic fluctuationsduring
the period prior to World War I. The standard "business cycle"analysis of
the period emphasizes the importance of domesticmonetary shocks in an
environment of sticky prices and inelasticmoney supply. In this paper, we
provide several consistent sets of evidence which show that those basic
assumptions are at odds with the data from the period. That is, we emphasize
that domestic autonomy was substantially limited byinternationally integrated
goods and capital markets. Such findings are likely to be important for
studying business cycles during the period; we have shown elsewhere (see
Calomiris and Hubbard, 1986) that, when prices are flexible, observedcyclical
movements can be related to a credit—market transmission of deflationary
shocks.
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The focus on international linkages has been common in theliterature;
indeed, recent studies of the operation of the classical gold standard have
revived interest in the process by which macroeconomic shockswere transmitted
internationally during this period (see Bordo and Schwartz, 1985). The
principal competing approaches differ according to the means by which
international equilibrium is re—established after a disturbanceoccurs in
capital, money, or commodity markets. According to the "price—specie—flow"
mechanism, shocks which raise (lower) the gap between the domesticmoney
supply and its equilibrium level raise (lower) the domestic price level; this
in turn decreases (increases) the balance of trade, which leadsto outflows
(inflows) of gold and eventually equilibration of thesystem at commodity
price levels consistent with foreign prices. More recent models of
international adjustment emphasize the roles of arbitrage andspeculation in—2—
efficient markets for capital, currency, and commodities. This "modern"
approach argues that interest rates and prices will maintain levels consistent
with foreign interest rates and prices in the short run, while currency,
capital, and commodity flows adjust to achieve long—run changes necessary to
restore equilibrium in all markets. The intuition for this result is that
speculative demands or supplies for commodities, capital, and money place
bounds on predictable short—run deviations of prices.
A representative view associated with the circuitous price—specie—flow
mechanism posits: sluggish international gold movements; sticky commodity
prices; the cyclical importance of money supply shocks (mainly shocks to the
money multiplier) and the consequent potential for central banks toinfluence
the aggregate money supply and (through it) interest rates and economic
activity. In order to argue that money multiplier shocks and central bank
interventions have more than fleeting influence on the real money supply, one
must assume both that commodity prices are rigid and that the supply of high—
powered money is inelastic. This general view is consistent with the price—
specie—f low sequence of events: International adjustment to monetary shocks
follows gradual domestic price adjustment which, through changes in the terms
of trade, brings about trade deficits (surpluses) and hence balance of
payments surpluses (deficits).
On the other hand, advocacy of the modern approach implies far less
domestic autonomy in the short run for interest rates, the money supply, and
commodity prices. According to the modern (or "internationalist") view, gold
supply is highly elastic, capital markets for some securities (internationally
traded commercial paper and bonds) are closely integrated internationally, and
domestic commodity gold prices are flexible and internationally determined
within "narrow" bandwidths of transaction cost (which includes transport and—3—
insurance fees, tariffs, and a fair rate ofreturn to international commodity
market speculators).2 Theseassumptions, in turn, imply demand determination
of the real (and nominal)money stock, an internationally determined
commercial paper rate (in gold units), anda minor role for any central bank
with respect to its ability to influence theaggregate money supply or the
rates of return on internationally traded securities.3Even in the absence of
highly responsive domestic prices, these results stillhold, but the lagging
adjustment of domestic prices to internationalprice shocks entails real
effects on the time path of the balance oftrade.
Essentially what is at issue in distinguishing thesetwo views
empirically is whether the deviations allowed bytransaction and information
costs in gold, capital, and commodity marketswere sufficiently small to
support the "close" short—run connections in prices andrates of return across
the Atlantic which the modernapproach posits. Were gold flows "sufficiently"
elastic? Were interest rates "closely"linked?
Our paper approaches these questions intwo ways: First, we measure the
responsiveness of gold flows and the bandwidths ofcapital and commodity
relative price variation directly. Whilethese direct measures provide some
evidence in favor of close internationallinks, we argue that price bandwidths
or correlations alone are insufficient evidenceto conclude that the modern
approach is superior to the price—specie—flow view.The narrowness of
bandwidths must be measured relative to themacroeconomic ii.portance of
relative price deviations. That is, even ifall relative prices were bounded
by bandwidths of one percent, if autonomousdomestic interest rate movements
of, say, a half percent have large macroeconomiceffects (if, for example, the
IS curve is very flat) then theprice—specie—flow view mayprovidea superior
description of the macroeconomic transmission of shocks.Thus we argue that—4—
macroeconomic simulation models are the best way to establish which of the two
views is a more useful historical model for explaining events of the period.
In sections II and III below we test various assumptions and conclusions
associated with the two competing views of international adjustment. We begin
in section II by presenting and interpreting separate pieces of evidence on
gold flows, interest rates, and selected commodity prices, as well as
summarizing related results from the literature, all of which shed light on
the alternative assumptions employed in the price—specie—flow and the modern
approaches. In section III we employ a monthly data set for the United States
and Britain f or the pre—World War I period in order to evaluate the overall
explanatory power of the respective frameworks. We compare the actual
historical importance of shocks and the observed patterns of short—run
adjustment to shocks with the predictions of each of the two models. Here we
employ the "structural VAR" approach for simultaneous—equations modeling
recently developed by Bernanke (1986) and Sims (1986). Section IV concludes
the paper.
II.EVIDENCEONMONEYSUPPLY ELASTICITY AND INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION OF
COMMODITYMID CAPITALMARKETS
Gold—Flow Responsiveness
Even an unsophisticated analysis of monthlygold flows leads one to
question the so—called "stylized fact" of gold supply inelasticity; a formal
treatment of the relationships among gold flows and other variables is
relegated to section LII. Figure 1 shows that transitory net flows of gold in
the United States were often very large. The mean and standard deviation of
the monthly net outflow over the period 1885 to 1914 are $45,000 and $11—5--
million, respectively. Positive net outflows have a mean of $8 million anda
standard deviation of $7.6 million, while net inf lows havea mean of $6.2
million and a standard deviation of $8.7 million. The ratio of thepotential
monthly flow of gold to the existing stock of gold is high, as well —in
December 1907 and January 1908, total net gold inf lows amountedto $106
million, compared to a stock of currency in circulation outside the Treasury
of $3.07 billion —composedof $1.86 billion held by the public and $1.21
held by banks —anda total money supply (M,) of approximately $11.6
billion.
Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions formonthly U.S.
gold flows are presented in Table 1. These patterns suggest an MA(2)process,
or possibly an AR(1). Under either specification, gold flows adjust fully to
disturbances within three months, with most of the adjustmentoccurring in the
first rinth. Coefficients, autocorrelation functions and partial
autocorrelation functions for residuals are presented in Table 2 for both
specifications.
These results are not surprising given the existence of the transatlantic
telegraph, the market for gold, and the available technology for transporting
gold by steamship across the Atlantic in a matter of days. Officer (1986)
carefully estimates the costs of international gold transport and finds that
the observed gold price differentials virtually never violate hisconstructed
cost bandwidths which average roughly half of one percent.5
Cold Flows and Capital-Market Integration
The evidence presented above suggests that any incipient rise in the
expected riskless rate of return (in gold terms) in the U.S. relative to
Britain of greater than 2 percent (annualized) would have been preventedby a—6—
short—term (six—month) capital inflow. Thecapitalinflow could have been
profitably accomplished through a transitory gold export (and re—import) to
(and from) America.
More specifically, a British investor observing a 2—percent interest
differential on six—month high—grade commercial paper could wire funds to New
York though a correspondent in London. The commercial paper purchase in New
York would be offset either by a temporary increase in American bankers'
balances in London (until the paper came due), or by a gold flow to the United
States. If the incipient interest rate gap had been the result of a money
multiplier shock, the latter likely would be the case.
Such a calculation, unfortunately, is quite sensitive to the assumed
holding period of capital inflows. If one assumed a three-month holding
period instead of six months, the interest differential tolerance rises to 4
per cent. Investors certainly had access to commercial paper of six—month
maturity, hut they may have been reluctant to tie up their gold in the U.S.
for six months due to the consequent loss in liquidity. Knowledge of a
shadow—price—of—liquidity schedule for international investors would be
necessary in order to establish a relevant range of tolerable interest
differentials using this approach.
Interest Rate Arbitrage andCapital—MarketIntegration
The existence of currency spot and forward contracting provides a method
for constructing another set of bandwidths on the gold interest rate
differential. Forward contracting became increasingly prevalent beginning in
the 1870s (see Perkins, 1974), but implicit forward contracting had been
availablefor centuries in the form of bills of exchange. A bill of exchange
is a promise to deliver some amount of one currency at a certain time in the—7—
future in exchange for some amount of anothercurrency today. Thus a bill—of—
exchange price can be derived from the interest rate on thecurrency paid
today, the forward rate of exchange, the brokerage fee, and the date of
delivery.
The existence of international markets in commercialpaper and bills of
exchange, together with the transatlantic telegraph, places limitson the
variation of interest rates across countries. These limitscan be described
in terms of the exclusion of arbitrage profit.
Considerthe three markets portrayed in Figure 2: the "sight" market in
NewYork for immediate delivery of pounds in London,the sixty—day bill of
exchangemarket in New York for delivery in London, and the Londonhigh—grade
commercial paper market.6 We definei, t, and r3 as proportional brokerage
fees for dealing in these respective markets.
A British arbitrageur could sell British commercialpaper for pounds,
then sell those pounds for dollars through hisagent in New York on the sight
market, and then instruct his agent to purchase sixty—day pounds with those
dollars. If the future pounds received, afterconsidering transaction costs,
were in excess of the present value of the amount of pounds placed in the
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where subscripts 0 and 1 refer to the present andfuture, iL is the sixty—day
British commercial paper rate, and all exchange ratesare quoted in New
York. Working in the opposite direction, an Americanarbitrageur could
acquire dollars by promising to deliver pounds in sixty days; then buypound—8—
sightbills, and exchange them for British commercial paper in London.Here
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In order to derive restrictions on the interest differential between
London and New York, one imist consider the arbitrage restrictions among the
pureforeign exchange futures market in London, the bill of exchangemarket in
New York, and the New York commerical paper market. Define 14and 15 asthe
proportional transaction costs in London forward currency, and NewYork
commercialpaper contracting, respectively. Following the same logic as
before:
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where an (*) denotes a London exchange rate, andi is the dollar interest
paid on New York commercial paper.
Conditions (3) and (4) together imply that —werethe gold standard
parity known to be a permanent feature of both country's monetary systems
——
forlow values of through t (i.e., principally large scale transactions)
and a small potential difference between sight rates in New York and London
given by the cost of moving gold, high—grade commercial paper interestrates
would be virtually identical in New York and London.—9—
Previous studies have rejected capital—market integration (in theform of
interest rate parity) between New York and London on the basisof a nearly
constant spot exchange rate series and a potentially large (typically
positive) interest differential between short—term high—grade commercialpaper
offered in the two cities (see for example Officer, 1986,p. 1072). As Figure
3 shows, this spread is potentiallyvery high for the period before 1897.
Friedman and Schwartz (1983, p. 515) recognize the potential role of
"silver risk" in causing spikes in the observed commercialpaper interest
differential. The possibility that the U.S. might have switched, defacto,
from a gold to a silver standard implies that dollar interestrates were a
probability—weighted, risk—discounted combination of gold and silver interest
rates. Thus large observed differentials between dollar andpound commercial
paper rates need not imply large differentials between U.S. and British rates
in gold terms. Garber (1986) argues that silver risk associated withthe
Bland—Allison and Sherman Acts and the election of 1896 explains much of the
interest differential between long—term U.S. and foreign securities in the
late nineteenth century. Indeed, the role of silver risk incausing higher
interest rates in, and capital flight from, the U.S. is acommon theme in the
popular literature of the day.7
The lack of reliable data on forward rates has discouraged furthertests
of this hypothesis. Fortunately, one does not needexplicit forward rate data
in order to test interest rate parity and establish the role of silverrisk in
the observed commercial paper interest differential. Bandwidths for condition
(3) may be calculated given data on the dollar price ofsixty—day bills of
exchange and sight exchange rates in New York, and the relevant British
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Inthe absence of transaction costs these two series should be identical. We
construct these variables using the monthly average of the London open—market
discount rate (based on weekly quotations from The Economist) and a monthly
$ $
averageof daily sixty—day, and sight, bill prices and respectively,
1 0
from Statistics for the United States, 1867—1909, published by the National
Monetary Commission. These two series are plotted in Figure 4. The close
relationship between these series is clearly visible.
In order to measure transaction cost bandwidths we calculate the middle
term in condition (3), which we call ARB. For the sample 1889:1 to 1909:12
ARBreacheda maximum of 1.00001 and a minimum of 0.99646. For the subperiod
1897:1 to 1909:12 the range was essentially the same: 0.99657 to 0.99994.
Under the assumption of identical i's, (3) implies maximum r values equal to
one minus the cube root of 0.99646, or 0.00118. Combining (3) and (4) and
assuming a proportional gold transport cost of 0.005, the allowable positive




where g is the gold—denominated U.S. rate. This, and its complementary
condition, imply that:—11—
L
(6) 0.9915 ( 1.0085.
g
The actual range of values for the middle term of condition (6)for the period
for which U.S. interest rates are clearly gold—denominated (after1897) is
from 0.995 to 1.00057.
These calculations imply that the sixty—day U.S. interestrate implicit
in the bill—of—exchange market is the same as thehigh—grade sixty—day U.S.
commercial paper rate, adjusting for transaction costs. Thusgold interest
parity is satisfied among the British open—market rate, the U.S.rate, and the
implicit U.S. rate in the bill—of—exchange market, adjusting for transaction
cost.9
Our results imply that the observedrange of interest rate differentials
between the U.S. and Britain for the period after the silvercrisis is a good
approximation of the range of gold interest differentials before thecrisis,
given the stability of arbitrage bandwidths. In otherwords, annual gold
interest rate differentials on high—grade commercialpaper in the U.S. and
Britain were essentially within 2 percent of one another for thethirty years
prior to World War I.
These calculations by themselves tell us little about the effective
domestic autonomy of regions within the U.S., or the nationas a whole, for
two reasons. First, we lack a standard against which tomeasure the
importance of a 2 percent potential international interest ratespread.
Second, the existence of imperfect capital markets implies that shocksto
local "information capital" —describedin Calomiris and Hubbard (1986) ——
willnot be solved by capital inflows. That is, not all economicactivity can
be financed by the commercial paper market.—12--
At the same time,theinterest rate parity calculations are useful for
two reasons. First, they demonstrate that the apparent relative weakness of
capital market links prior to 1896 is an artifact of the mismeasurement of the
numeraire, rather than a substantive difference. Second, the 2—percent
bandwidths place limits on the potential for explaining macroeconomic
fluctuations in a perfect—capital—markets, closed—economy, IS—LM framework.
In particular, the latitude for domestic money—multiplier shocks to be
transmitted to output through the domestic money market's effect on the
interest rates of traded securities is substantially circumscribed. The exact
limitations on the causal role of money supply shocks, per se, depend on —
interalia —theresponsiveness of investment and consumption to interest
rate shocks. If one found that investment were unresponsive to interest rate
movements of 2 percent —i.e.,if business cycles are hard to explain as
movements along an IS curve within 2 percent bandwidths —thenan emphasis on
IS shocks, or on credit-market disturbances under imperfect capital markets,
would be warranted. These issues will be taken up again in our discussion of
changing interest rate seasonality, and in section III.
Defining the Scope of the Financial Market: Tests of Integration
McCloskey and Zecher (1985) point out that what is primarily at issue in
the debate over the international transmission of disturbances is the
geographical boundaries of the basic unit of macroeconomic analysis. Defining
a national monetary aggregate, the domestic balance of trade and national GNP
and organizing one's discussion around these definitions implicitly presumes
that market integration within the United States is substantially greater
than, say, the integration between New York and London markets. MeCloskey and
Zecher argue cogently that the proper way to test our aggregation boundaries—13—
and models of the international transmission of shocks is tocompare arbitrage
limits within a country with those between countries. They call this the
"Genberg—Zecher criterion." McCloskey and Zecher (1976) find that commodity
price co—movements within the United States are no stronger than those between
New York and London. They conclude that national boundaries are an arbitrary
means of defining economic units for commodity trade under the classical gold
standard. 10
One may apply the Cenberg—Zecher criterion to the gold market by
comparing international gold points with exchange rate premia and discounts
across different cities within the United States. International gold points
derived from Officer (1986) for the period October 1900 to March 1907 are
always less than 0.5 per cent. Data for this period for exchange rates on New
York from Chicago, St. Louis, New Orleans, and San Francisco show that
deviations from New York gold prices in Chicago, St. Louis and New Orleans are
contained within bandwidths of 0.1 percent (with the exception of the
suspension of 1907). For San Francisco, inter—city bandwidths are often
slightly higher.
These results illustrate the difficulty of employing the Genberg—Zecher
criterion as a test of market integration. While this criterion offers
sufficient grounds for rejecting the extreme view of nationally integrated,
domestically autonomous economies, it does not by itself tell us which
direction to go in placing boundaries on the basic macroeconomic unit. Is a
large international scope or a narrow regional scope more appropriate? What
is lacking is an independent measure of how "small" a gold point of 0.1 or 0.5
percent is in economic terms.
The speed of adjustment and reversal of gold flows following transient
r!loney—multiplier disturbances sheds some light on the question of whether—14—
regional or international scope is best for understanding macroeconomic
phenomena at, say, an annual time horizon. The regional pattern of gold flows
during crisis supports the view of New York as an active entrepot between the
domestic interior and London, with elastic gold flows in both directions. For
example, from October 18 to December 27, 1907 net shipments of gold from banks
in New York to the U.S. interior total $129 million. From January 3 to
January 31 fully $69 million in net shipments had returned to New York.12
International accounts also show this rapid inf low and outflow of gold. From
June through September 1907 net gold exports total $29 million; from October
1907 to April 1908 net gold imports total $122 million; from May to September
1908 net gold exports total $45 million. The upshot of these findings is that
in annual —ora fortiori "business—cycle" —time,the market for gold
operates well enough that gold sluggishness per se cannot be faulted for
persistent macroeconomic fluctuations.
In analyzing these international gold flows it is important to note that
the elasticity of gold flows does not imply that real shocks ——inparticular,
shocks to credit markets which affect borrowers' wealth and banks' credit-
worthiness —willbe alleviated by gold flows. Gold flows are endogenous to
aggregate real economic activity and generally will respond procyclically, as
well as in response to shifts in the domestic demand for gold relative to
other commodities.
Capital—Market Integration and the Changing Seasonality of Interest Rates
Miron (1986) reports a significant reduction in the seasonality of call
loan rates after the founding of the Federal Reserve System. By itself, this
result seems to argue in favor of viewing the U.S. money supply as
significantly (if not importantly) domestically determined. Miron explains—15--
this finding by an appeal to "sluggish" gold flows, andhence, at least short—
run domestic autonomy. In particular, Mironargues that gold supply
sluggishness made the economy vulnerable to large seasonalswings in interest
rates due to money—multiplier disturbances.
Clark (1986) disputes Miron's interpretion that theestablishment of the
Fed was responsible for the reduction in interestrate seasonality. Clark
demonstrates that the reduction in interest rateseasonality was an
international phenomenon, and that the timing of theseasonality shift occurs
prior to the seasonality shift in currency and high—poweredmoney. Moreover,
the changes in seasonal patterns Miron observesare not evenly spread —that
is, the overall reduction in seasonality is mainly due to reductionsin the
largest seasonals which represent average interest rate fluctuationsof
between 3 and 5 percent. Our interest rate parity calculationsimply that
such large fluctuations could not have occurred in the UnitedStates in the
absence of similar movements in international interestrates. Thus Clark's
findings —togetherwith the 2—percent bandwidths of interest rateparity we
report —argueagainst the view that large swings in interest rates in the
U.S. before 1914 were caused by inelasticgold and capital flows. Of course,
as we pointed out before, the Fed could have had importantmacroeconomic
influence as a creditor to banks, regardless of its influenceover the
aggregate supply of money, per Se. This would be consistent with Miron's
finding of increased loan seasonality after the founding of the Fed.
WhyConstructBandwiths of Autonomous Relative Conmodity Price Variation?
Short—run commodity price linkages across countriesare not a necessary
condition for money supply elasticity. Bandwidths of relativeinternational
commodity price variation, however, place restrictions on the variations in—16—
the short—run terms of trade, and hence on short—run movementsin the current
account, which may have important macroeconomic consequences.
Much of the previous work on international commodity price linkages—
summarizedin McCloskey and Zecher (1985) —hasfocused on comparisons of
price co—movements as measured by regression coefficientsof one price or
price level on another, or by simple correlation.This is not an appropriate
method for answering the question, "how closely linked are prices?,"in an
environment where transaction and information costs create bandwidthsof
autonomous domestic price variation. To see this, supposethat most important
incipient macroeconomic disturbances —say,to the domestic money multiplier
—wouldimply (ceteris paribus) nominal price changes of at least, say,
5—percent. Furthermore, suppose that estimated relative pricebandwidths are
1—percent. This is an environment in which autonomous domesticshocks are not
important, one in which the "law of one price" is the mostuseful assumption
for understanding price movements over the business cycle.
Will the economy —underthe conditions we have assumed —necessarily
show a high correlation between national commodity prices or pricelevels?
The answer is no. If substantial shocks occur infrequently and if mostof the
time prices move independently within the 1—percent bandwidths, correlation
between the two may be weak. This example illustrates the importanceof
measuring bandwidths and evaluating the economic importanceof their size,
rather than calculating correlations or regression coefficients to determine
the validity of the assumption of close short—run international price
13
linkages.
From the outset it is important to separate two potential motivations for
constructingrelative price bandwidths. One is to determine whether observed
deviations of relative commodity prices from unity can be explained in a—17—
manner consistent with zero economic profit; the second is to determine
whether the bandwidths are narrow enough to preclude iportant potential
relative price changes important for macroeconomic fluctuations.
With respect to the first motivation one can adjust price differentials
for tariffs, insurance costs, the cost of transportation, and a "fair" rate of
return, and then test to see if observed relative prices violate the
constructed bounds. Assuming we can thus explain relative price deviations as
the drift between speculative bandwidths, we must then ask whether these
speculative bandwidths are "narrow" or "wide" from the standpoint of
macroeconomic importance. For example, how much of the variation in the
balance of trade can be attributed to domestic price disturbances within the
relative price bandwidths? Section III provides the best framework for
quantifying —interalia —theimportance of autonomous domestic price
movements for the balance of trade.'4
Testing the zero—economic—profits assumption is interesting in itself,
because of the connection between zero economic profits and domestic price
flexibility. Domestic price flexibility —i.e.,the responsiveness of prices
to aggregate demand shocks —isseparable from the question of narrow
international price bandwidths. Domestic prices may be responsive, but
insulated by transaction costs from international price movements. Therefore,
price flexibility is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for short—
run international price parity. Thus evidence of responsive domestic prices
for this period —asdescribed in Calomiris and Hubbard (1986), DeLong and
Summers (1986), Rush (1985), and Sachs (1980), —isencouraging but not
conclusive for the proponents of price arbitrage, while the demonstration of
international price linkages across many commodities provides direct support
for the assumption of price flexibility, even if price bandwidths arevery
large. In other words, deionstrating that prices can change quickly when—18—
there exists an incentive to change them —i.e.,that long—run bandwidths are
the same as short—run bandwidths —providesevidence in favor of flexible
prices regardless of the size of the bandwidths. Thus the important issue of
domestic price flexibility is logically related to the question of whether
arbitrageurs earn zero economic profits, rather than to the question of how
much the terms of trade may vary with aggregate demand shocks.
Testing the Zero—Econoide—Profit Hypothesis: Cotton, Wheat, andSugar
Inprinciple, one could construct bandwidths for all traded goods and
describe the restrictions they impose on the price level in a disaggregated
macroeconomic model with many individual supply and demand equations.
Alternatively, one could argue for a particular weighting scheme across
commodities and derive representative price bounds for traded goods as a
whole. This would be different, of course, from inferring price bounds from
the wholesale price index and assuming such bounds are representative.
We undertake neither of these procedures for the following reasons.
First, even if one had a plausible set of weights to establish representative
bandwidths, the issue of a standard against which to judge whether such bounds
are wide or narrow naturally arises. As we have argued at length above,
simulation models are the proper way to evaluate the economic importance of
drift within speculative bandwidths. Second, in practice we have found it
difficult to construct comparable price series for Britain and the United
States for many commodities. Some data reported in, or summarized from, trade
journals fail to quote prices at clearly specified points in time. Often the
precise grade of the commodity is left vague, as. well. Many times even the
unit of measure is unclear. For example, there are manymeaningsto the word
"bushel," some of which may vary in use geographically within England. Many
sources fail to distinguish explicitly among "shipping," "railroad freight,"—1 9-•
"dry," "liquid," and "avoirdupois" measures, which can bevery different.
Often units can be inferred from long—run priceratios, but obviously such an
inference precludes tests of price linkages.
For these reasons we only report results for three commodities —Cotton,
wheat, and raw sugar. Calculations for these commodities willserve to test
the zero—profit condition and thereby establish thedegree of price
flexibility for internationally traded goods.
First, we consider cotton, defined in pounds of middling—grade raw
fiber.15 Each country's end—of--monthprice series, and the ratio of the two
price series, are given in Figure 5. There was no tariff applied toraw
Cotton in either Britain or the U.S. The relative price of U.S.cotton is
almost always in the neighborhood of 0.9. The lower U.S.price is explained
by the fact that cotton is indigenous to the United States and notto
Britain. There are virtually no persistent deviationsbeyond the bounds 0.88
and 0.95. Any penetration of these boundsmay be viewed as unforseeable and
transitory. These bounds are narrow relative to the short—run v-ariation in
prices within each country —Cottonprices frequently fall or rise by 50—100
percent within a matter of months.
Is a l2—percent sustainable price differential consistent witha "fair"
rate of return? It would seem so. The shipping costs for cottonquoted in
Fairplay for 1880 through 1913 are in the range of 5 percent, including
primage. We abstract from reductions over time in transportcosts, which were
gradual and small relative to total speculative costs. Table 3 shows the
reduction in the nominal and real transport cost index from 1880to 1910.If
one adds to transport cost a standard insurance fee of between 1 and 2percent
and considers "shoe—leather" costs, cotton price risk, anda two—month
financing cost of 1 percent (assuming a two—month response lag due to the time—20—
it takes to purchase, deliver, and receive payment for a shipment), a
persistent deviation in relative price of 10 to 12 percent seemsreasonable.
When performing similar calculations for wheat and sugar one must adjust
for the tariffs placed on these commodities by the United States. Tariffs do
not affect the incentives of speculators contemplating a shipment fromthe
United States, but do affect the incentives to ship from Britain to the United
States. To be explicit, efficient speculation implies:
(7)Ps(1—d) —c> GB' and
(8) < P —
w w where "US and GB are the American and British prices of wheat, respectively,
d is the ad valorem duty on wheat in the United States, and c is speculative
cost —inclusiveof finance, transport, insurance, and shoe—leather costs,
and price risk. If (7) were violated, shipments of goods from Britain to the
U.S. would imply excess profit; if (8) were violated, shipments from the U.S.
to Britain would imply excess profit.
This provides two independent means of testing bounds on c. Persistent
deviations below unity in the unadjusted relative price (uS'GB should be
greater than (1—c); persistent deviations above unity in the tariff—adjusted
relative price should be bounded by (1+c). End—of—month wheat prices and
price ratios —simpleand tariff—adjusted —appearin Figure 5. The
unadjusted price ratio is almost always above 0.9, while the adjusted ratio
almost never is above 1.1. These results thus imply similar price bounds to
those derived for cotton.—21—
The same exercise maybeperformed for sugar prices, plotted in Figure
7. As in the case of wheat and cotton, price variations within eachcountry
are potentially great, while price bounds imply that persistent relative—price
deviations are contained by bounds on speculative profit. That is, thesugar
price ratio adjusted for tariffs is generally below 1.1, while the simple
ratio never falls below unity because tariffs rendered unprofitable the export
of sugar from the U.S.
This last observation illustrates the difficulty in drawing inferences
about domestic autonomy from tests of economic profit. No profits were
possible for exporting sugar from the U.S. because tariffs insulated the U.S.
price of sugar from the prices in other markets.
In summary, wholesale prices for traded goods appear to have been
flexible. Speculators responded quickly to profit incentives and thereby
preserved price parity, adjusted for cost. Given the homogeneity of most
goods and the relative absence of long—term contracting during our period, we
view wholesale price data as representative of prices more generally. This
period contrasts with the current economic setting in which long—term
contracting and product differentiation make the assumption of wholesale price
representativenegs dubious (see Hicks, 1974). Mills (1932, pp. 78-86) finds
that the variation in manufactured goods prices on an annual basis for the
pre—Worid War I years matches that of raw materials, but that raw materials
prices are more volatile from month to month. Mills also finds that overall
monthly consumer price variability matches that of producer prices, with the
same distinction between the volatility of raw and processed goods prices.—22—
SuaryofFindings on International Integration in Capital Markets and
CoiodityMarkets
We have established several propositions relevant for understanding
international adjustment under the gold standard. Gold flows were elastic, in
the sense that innovations in the desired distribution of gold led to rapid
adjustment (i.e., full adjustment occurs in under three months). Commodity
flows were similarly responsive, though the bandwidths of autonomous relative
price movement are greater (10 to 12 percent as opposed to 0.5 percent). The
tolerance for the gold—denominated interest differential between the U.S. and
Britain is essentially constant throughout the period (if one adjusts properly
for currency risk) at roughly 2 percent. Changes in interest rate seasonality
are explained mainly by events which have international scope.
As we have noted frequently in our discussion, these results alone do not
provide a conclusive test of short—run domestic autonomy because they cannot
tell us how iiiiportant, from a macroeconomic perspective, were autonomous
domestic deviations in interest rates and prices. To this end, section III
develops a simulation model of macroeconomic disturbances.
III. SIMULATIONOFTHE MACROECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF DOMESTIC
ANDINTERNATIONALSHOCKS
Our goal here is to measure the relative importance of domestic and
international shocks in financial and commodity markets for influencing
output, interest rates, prices, gold flows, and the balance of trade. For
example, were domestic money supply shocks, per Se, an important source of
macroeconomic disturbance? How do money—supply shocks compare in importance
to disturbancesinmoney—demand, or other macroeconomic disturbances? How
important are changes in the terms—of—trade for short—run movements in the
balanceof trade? In order to answer these questions we construct a model of
the U.S. economy and its international linkages.—23—
Data andEconometric Approach
Our results from section II imply potentially rapid adjustment of
interest rates, prices, and commodity and gold flows. In order tocapture
important features of shocks and responses, we construct a monthly dataset
which includes U.S. and British interest rates and wholesaleprice indices,
and U.S. data on exports, imports, gold flows, andoutput (using pigiron
production as a proxy).16 We begin our sample in January 1897 —afterthe
"silver crisis" years —andend it in June 1914, before the outbreak of war.
In order to analyse dynamic adjustment to disturbanceswe adopt an
approach recently developed by Bernanke (1986) and Sims (1986) as an
alternative to "reduced—form" recursive identification of disturbances. The
alternative "structural VAR" approach permits one to solvea simultaneous—
equations model in innovations in which orthogonalized shocks and their
interrelations are associated with functions, not with variables. The first
stage of a structural VAR model is identical to a standard VAR —lagged
values of all variables are included to estimate reduced—formpredictions, and
to derive series of unpredicted innovations (which are correlatedacross
variables). In the next stage, one posits a matrix ofcontemporaneous
functional relationships which can be tested and whichimply time series of
orthogonalized shocks to the hypothesized functions.
One then calculates impulse responses of each variable in thesystem to
shocks which originate in particular functions, and decompositions of each
variable's forecast variance, which attribute one's uncertaintyregarding the
future of any particular variable to each of the functional shocks.Impulse
responses and variance decompositions together permit one to infer the time—
path of a given shock's influence on all variables, as well as its economic
importance.—24—
ASiiltaneoue-Equat1onsModel for the U.S.
Weposit seven functional relationships for our seven—variable model: an
equilibrium—output equation for the U.S., an exogenously determined
international (British) riskiess interest rate, U.S. money—supply and money—
demand equations, demand functions for U.S. imports and exports, and a desired
short—run capital—flow equation, which we set equal to the balance of trade net of
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where all, variables are defined as innovations, and where Y denotes the growth
rate of output, i and are the New York commercial paper rate and London
open—market discount rate respectively, G is U.S. net iEports of gold, X and M
are U.S. commodity exports and imports, and P is the log ratio of the U.S. to
British wholesale price indices. All terms with an asterisk are mutually—25—
orthogonal. is the exogenously determined innovation in the Britishopen—
market discount rate. i is the orthogonal money—supply shock. X isthe
disturbance to desired net foreign savings, Y is the equilibrium—output
disturbance (which includes IS shocks and supply—side creditshocks, as
discussed in the Appendix). M* is the shock to the demand for imports. Pis
the export—demand disturbance. G is the innovation in U.S. demandfor money
(gold).
The U.S. money—supply equation assumes that net gold importsrespond
positively to U.S., and negatively to British, interest—rate innovations.
Equation (11) posits that U.S. desired short—run net savings responds
positively to foreign, and negatively to own, interest—rate changes.
Our specification of the equililbrium output equation (12)assumes
negative interest elasticity in aggregate demand, as well as a positive
relative domestic price response in aggregate supply. In addition,we posit a
negative interest elasticity in aggregate supply and a positive price—response
in aggregate demand and supply which arise in thepresence of imperfect
capital markets and nominal contracting (seethe Appendix and Calomiris and
Hubbard, 1986, and 1987).
The U.S. demand for imports is assumed to depend positivelyon P and Y,
and negatively on i. We write export demand as anegative function of P,
and an indeterminate function of i-. The sign of L in equation (14)depends
on whether foreign interest—rate innovations are associated mainly with
expansion or contraction abroad.
The money demand equation assumes a standard formulation in which shocks
to desired money balances, and hence net gold inflows,are related to
disturbances in price, income, and the interest rate.—26—
There are two criteria against w'hich to measure the reasonableness of
this identification of functional disturbances. One is the estimated
coefficients (and standard errors) of the matrix of contemporaneous
disturbances —i.e.,how many coefficients are of the right sign? The other
involves the time paths of the impulse response functions to each functional
disturbance. If, for example, negative shocks to the supposed money-supply
innovation equation (positive i shocks) imply positive output and negative
interest rate responses, it would be difficult to believe that one properly
had identified a money—supply disturbance.
Estimation Results
We regress each of the original seven variables in our model on six
lagged values of all variables, monthly dummies, a time trend, and the tariff
on pigiron. We include the tariff in order to abstract from relative supply
shifts, given our use of pigiron as the output proxy. We save these reduced
form equations for use in simulation and define their residuals as the
innovations y, 1NY, 1L, x, M, P, and G, modeled in system (9) through (15).
The results for the simultaneous—equations model in innovations are given
below (standard errors appear in parentheses):





















(15) G=—0.3441—0.117Y + 2.66 P +G t
(0.614) (0.140) (0.93)
t
Only one of the coefficients in this system of equations contradicts our
model —thesign on Y in the money—demand equation is negative. All thirteen
other estimated coefficients are of the right sign and some are measured
precisely. As Sims (1986, p. 12) notes, however, the method we use for
constructing standard errors need not be veryaccuratesince it is based on an
approximate second—derivative matrix.
As we noted before, the coefficients in the contemporaneous—association
matrix are not conclusive by themselves. The best way to verify our
functional identification of disturbances is to determine the "reasonableness"
of the simulated responses to the hypothesized shocks.
At the same time, not all impulse responses merit equal weight in
determining the reasonableness of our identification. Rather, one wishes to
ascertain whether the iaportant sources of disturbances in the model are
consistent with our identification matrix. The importance of disturbances for
influencing any variable's future may be measured by the forecast variance—28--
decompositionof that variable. For example, functional disturbances in
export demand are important for gold inflows if they play a large role in
explaining future uncertainty about gold inflows.
S1ilationResults
Forecast—variance decompositions which describe the percent contribution
from each functional disturbance to each variable in the system at time
horizons of 3, 12, and 20 months are given in Table 4. Beside these figures,
we indicate whether the sign of the impulse response at that time horizon is
positive (+),negative(—),oressentially zero (N). Table 4 allows us to
test our identifying assumptions by making sure that important sources of
disturbances have effects consistent with our model.
At the same time, Table 4 allows us to assign relative importance to
domestic and international factors in the determination of output, prices,
interest rates, gold flows, and foreign trade. In particular, one can
ascertain: whether —asthe modern approach predicts —exportsand imports
are responsive in the short run to relative price changes; whether prices or
income respond importantly to money—supply shocks; and whether shocks to net
savings,and export and import demand, contribute greatly to price and
interest—rate variation (as the modern approach predicts), relative to
domestic shocks which are independent of international developments
*
NY * * (i ,Y , and G ).
Thesigns of impulse responses are quite supportive of the model's
identifying assumptions. U.S. money—supply contractions not explained by gold
flows —i.e.,money—multiplier shocks —arecaptured in Such shocks
produce unimportant contractions in output and have a less persistent effect
on than do changes in international interest rates(1L)• Moneysupply—29—
shocks have a persistent, positive effect on gold flows, though this accounts
only for roughly 4 percent of gold—flow forecast variance. U.S. money—supply
shocks have virtually no effect on relative international prices in the short,
or long, run. This provides strong evidence against the causal role of
autonomous money supply shocks for U.S. business cycles.
British interest rate innovations seem to be associated with
international expansion, reflected in lagging, but important, positive effects
on U.S. exports. A direct link to the U.S. economy comes from the negative
impact of higher foreign interest rates on output through interest—rate
parity.
Innovations in desired net savings (X*) play an important role in the
determination of the U.S. interest rate, short—run commodity price movements
(which dampen quickly), imports, and exports. All of these effects are of the
predicted signs —adesire to save more leads to a period of high exports,
low commodity and gold imports, low relative domestic prices, and a lower U.S.
interest rate. The response of output to the savings shock is harder to
explain. The initial positive, and subsequent negative, response of output
may reflect a very short—run "Keynesian" contraction followed by a longer—run
"equilibrium" expansion in response to a reduction in the propensity to
consume.
Shocks coming from domestic aggregate supply and demand (y*) which are
unrelated to monetary disturbances, saving preferences, international
interest—rate disturbances and the demands for imports and exports play an
important role in short—run domestic interest rate determination. Imports
respond positively to income innovations, as do interest rates. The positive
response of both interest rates and income to equilibrium output shocks
reflects ——inthe context of the model described in the Appendix —a—30—
positive correlation between aggregate supply and demand disturbances. In
Calomiris and Hubbard (1986) we argue that disturbances to credit markets will
be a source of positive correlation between aggregate supply and demand shocks
(see also Blinder, 1985, and Bernanke, 1981, and 1983).
The negative response of gold flows to output innovations —which
mirrors the negative estimataed coefficient on Y in equation (15) appears
puzzling and is a relatively important contributor to future gold flows.
One way to explain this finding is to appeal to the relationship between
current output innovations and predictable future changes in the money
multiplier. If current positive innovations in output lead to increased
overall money demand and predict an increase in the money multipliei, then
output innovations maybenegatively associated with current gold flows
through anticipatory gold demand. Evidence for co—movements between output
growth and the money—multiplier appears in Cagan (1965, p. 25). Cagan finds
that at peaks and troughs money—multiplier changes are more closely associated
with income than variations in high—powered money, and that the money—
multiplier is pro—cyclical. Our use of monthly data precludes a direct test
of this hypothesis since we lack data on the currency—to—deposit and reserve—
to—deposit ratios at that frequency.
Another explanation —whichalso relies on a supposed negative
correlation between output shocks and the money multiplier —emphasizesthe
role of credit, as opposed to money shocks. In an environment of imperfect
capital markets, the effects of money—multiplier shocks may not be fully
captured by money—supply shocks (i). In this case, output movements (y*)
will contain marginal information regarding current money—multiplier shocks,
*
NY
over and above i •Inthis case gold flows are not anticipatory; rather it
is current money—multiplier shocks which account for the correlation between—31—
* * Yand G. It is important to note that this does timplythat Y should be
interpreted as a money—supply disturbance in disguise. Money—supply shocks,
NY * perSe, will be fully reflected in the shadow price of liquidity (i 3.Ymay
contain additional information, however, related to credit shocks which follow
from reductions in the money multiplier. For an extended discussion of this
point, see Bernanke (1983) and Calomiris and Hubbard (1986).
These potential connections between output movements andmoney—multiplier
shocks raises the possibility that —contraryto our model's restriction —
G*and Y should be correlated, because of the omission of themoney—
multiplier from the model. In this case, equation (15) will properly measure
gold demand, but not money demand defined morebroadly.G* shocks have
effects on U.S. prices and interest rates consistent withviewing equation
(15) as a gold—demand function.
Innovations in export and import demands —whichmay reflect, inter
alia, changes in preferences, tariff changes not captured by price indices,or
measurement errors due to price aggregation —providestrong support for our
model. Impulse responses to a positive shift in import demandimply the
predicted negative U.S. relative—price response, a lesserresponse in exports
and a rise in the interest differential between U.S. and Britishsecurities,
which implies a consistent movement along the net foreign savings function.
Response patterns to shocks from export demand provide furthersupport
for the model. Export demand shocks raise relative U.S. prices, andproduce a
positive repsonse in commodity imports and gold inflows.
On the whole, our results provide evidence in favor of elasticresponses
to relative commodity prices. Moreover, shocks to desired savings andexport
and import demands, explain between 70 and 75 percent of the forecast variance—32—
of relative price at all time horizons. Export and import demands by
themselves account for roughly 50 percent. This contrasts sharply with the
relatively small contributions to relative prices from or money—supply
shocks.
IV. CONCLUSION
To summarize, in section II we find evidence which supports close direct
asset and commodity price linkages across countries in the short run. Gold
flows respond rapidly to the demand for gold. Interest rate parity, adjusted
for "silver risk" and transaction costs, held with the same force throughout
our sample. Commodity prices were flexible in the sense that short—run
wholesale price adjustment across countries was not sluggish relative to long
runmovements.
Our results from section III Indicate that the bandwidths of transaction
costs in markets f or internationally traded securities were narrow in the
sense that domestic money—supply shocks, per se, were not an important source
of output variation. Domestic money—supply shocks did influence exports and
gold flows by affecting incentives for capital and money accumulation. The
short—run price elasticities of import and export demand functions are a
significant and important channel of influence from international disturbances
to relative international prices, while autonomous domestic disturbances are
unimportant for the ratio of international price indices.
Though a more thorough treatment of the sources of unexplained
disturbances in output is beyond the scope of this paper, we argue elsewhere
(Calomiris and Hubbard, 1986) that capital market disturbances —whichaffect
both aggregate supply and demand in an environment of imperfect information —
accountfor the (equilibrium) fluctuations in output which characterize—33--
pre—tiorid War I business cycles. This approach proves fruitful for explaining
the priority of price to output shocks noted by DeLong and Summers (1986), and
their long—run co—movements (i.e., the Phillips curve). It also provides a
rationale for the predictive role of money for nominal income —i.e.,the
money stock is linked to real changes in bank loan supply which respond,
inter alia, to deflationary shocks.—34—
Notes
1Specifically,we show that price flexibility can have adverse effects on
macroeconomic performance through constraints on the availability of
credit in the presence of nominal contracting in financial markets. We
examine links between price flexibility and credit rationing within the
framework of models of imperfect information in loan markets.
2We discuss below the difficulty of defining "narrow" in a way which permits
a useful test of domestic price autonomy.
It is important to note that these assumptions do not imply the irrelevance
of central bank lending to domestic banks; merely that the influence such
loans may have does not come from an effect on the money supply per Se.
tn Calomiris and Hubbard (1986) we argue that capital—market
imperfections, and hence the well—being of banks and borrowers, played an
important role in propagating pre—World War I business cycles. In this
context, government assistance to beleaguered banks could have had
important macroeconomic consequences. In that paper, we show that the
observed correspondences between money and nominal income growth, and
between inflation and real income growth (the Phillips Curve), are
consistent with a regime of elastic gold supply, flexible prices, and
capital market imperfections. This contrasts with the standard approach
to explaining these correspondences which abstracts from capital market
imperfections, and assumes an inelastic money supply and rigid prices.
Gold flows are defined as the difference between gold imports and exports
(See Data Appendix). Currency holdings of banks and individuals, and
total money supply, are taken from Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary
Statistics of the United States, p. 402 and p. 65, respectively.
Officer reports costs which vary over time and depending on country of
origin. Because the British had lower interest rates, which enter into
the cost of shipping, gold export costs are typically higher than half a
percent with an average of 0.65 percent over the period 1890 to 1904.
Officer's calculations overstate the gold cost of U.S. exports, however,
because he interprets U.S. interest rates to be gold interest rates. As
we show below, U.S. interest rates in gold terms were much closer to
British levels than previously recognized, once one adjusts for silver
devaluation risk.
6
Figure 2 is inspired by Deardorff (1979).
That currency risk was a significant potential problem was certainly on the
minds of contemporary chroniclers of international business conditions.
The large outflows of gold associated with the fulfillment of the Sherman
Act precipitated a lack of .confidence in the ability of the U.S. Treasury
to maintain its commitment to the gold standard. Consider for example
these representative accounts from foreign correspondents of the Economist
magazine.
"The first bomb which was dropped this week was that by the President in
his decision not to issue or sell bonds, in order to maintain the
$100,000,000 of gold reserve in the Treasury ...Thefirst effect of this—35—
unexpected news was to intensify the feeling of depression which had gone
before, and prices of the more active securities promptly declined.
Europe was not slow to observe the drift here and joined the ranks of
sellers." (March 4, 1893, p. 265).
"While President Cleveland's inaugural address shows that he holds sound
views on the currency question, it remains to be seen to what extent he
will be able to make those views prevail." (March 11, 1893, p. 289).
"...it would appear, therefore, that for some time longer doubts as to the
ability of the Treasury to maintain the parity of silver and gold will
continue to act as a drag upon business in the States, to depreciate the
value of American securities, and to cause a certain uneasiness and want
of stability in the European money markets." (March 11. 1893, p. 290).
"With the renewal of gold exports from the United States, the fear that
the Treasury will not be able to maintain gold payments, and that the
country will, by force of circumstance, be compelled to content itself
with the single silver standard, has revived ...Nowit is quite evident
that the Treasury cannot go on losing gold, and at the same time piling up
liabilities payable in gold on demand in the way it has been doing,
without imperilling the convertibility of its notes." (April 15, 1893, p.
442).
"In 1890, prior to the passing of the Sherman Act, the reserve
exceeded £38,000,000 while the outstanding government notes redeemable in
gold amounted to a little under £67,000,000. Since then, however a two-
fold process has been in operation. The Treasury has been steadily losing
gold, while it has been continuously issuing notes to the amount of
£11,000,000 a year in payment of its compulsory purchases of silver.
the reserve continues to dwindle, and the volume of paper money to
increase, with the result that the apprehensions that have long been felt
lest the Treasury should be unable to maintain gold payments have at least
reached the acute stage....itis this that is at the bottom of all the
trade and financial disturbance to which our New York correspondent today
calls attention. ...the ability of the Treasury to maintain the gold
value of all this money has come to be seriously questioned; there is a
sharp contraction of credit, and a consequent collapse of many over—
inflated concerns." (June 3, 1893, p. 656).
8
New York prices for sixty—day and sight bills are from Statistics for the
United States, 1867—1909, published by the National Monetary Commission in
1910. The monthly average of the London open—market rate is NBER series
13016, based on weekly data from The Economist.
Another approach to establishing this three—way parity relationship, which
abstracts from the existence of transaction costs, is to compare the
results of the following two regressions:
NY L
(a) i =a0 i +c, and—36—
(b) i o+ 8i(FSR)'+
Ifthe New York conimerical paper rate is equal to the London rate plus a
time—varying error term which captures silver risk, a1 and should be
unity; a0 should be zero and negative one; the R—squared for the two
regressions should be the same; and the correlation between c and
should be perfect. Our results are as follows (standard errors are in
parentheses):
(a) i 0.0056 +0.486i + t(0.0003) (0.056)
R—squared =0.23;







In the presence of transaction costs, these estimated coefficients will
be biased, since cost bandwidths imply a tolerance for the independent
movement of asset prices. The regression coefficients will represent an
averaging of episodes when interest rates move large distances together
and small distances independently. This explains why ——eventhough
interest rates are closely linked —theexact predictions of the model
which abstracts from transaction costs do not hold in regressions
(7) through (9). This also explains why the coefficient is slightly
larger than a1, and why the R—squared for (8) is larger than that
for (7): the nominal U.S. rate is more closely linked to the U.S. gold
rate (FSR) than to the London gold rate (1)• As we will point out
again in our discussion of commodity bandwidths, this is an argument
against using regression coefficients, and in favor of calculating
bandwidths, if one is interested in evaluating the economic importance of
autonomous domestic price movements.—37—
'°We discuss the McCloskey and Zecher approach to measuring price co—movements
in more detail below. We argue that the price bandwidths we report
provide a better measure of market integration than correlation or
regression statistics like those reported in McCloskey and Zecher (1976,
1985).
"Data are from Statistics for the United States, 1867—1909,pp. 209—229.
'2Data are from Statistics for the United States, 1867—1909,p. 231.
'3We discuss a similar point in the context of interest rate parity in
footnote 9.
14McCloskey and Zecher (1985)regress the balance of trade on ratios or
relative price indices and find insignificant and unimportant coefficients
on the relative price terms in their regressions. Evidence we report
below indicates that these results may be a misleading indicator of the
effect of relative price differences on the balance of trade.
15For sources of commodity price data see the Data Appendix.
16The well—known Persons (1931) index of industrial production relies mainly
on bank clearings and other variables of questionable relevance for
output. Another alternative, the level of imports, is unattractive for
our purposes because price effects on imports are contaminated by the
terms—of—trade effect. Pig iron is highly correlated (with a correlation
coefficient of 0.84 in growth rates) with total non—agricultural commodity
output, on an annual basis. Hull (1911) argues that iron is the
"barometer of trade" because of its ubiquitous presence as an output.—38—
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DERIVINGTHE EQUILIBRIUM OUTPUT EQUATION
We begin by considering the aggregate supply function:
Ys1P +s2L(i)
+a
where 81 and are positive coefficients, L is the supply—determined level of
bank loans; Y, i, and P are innovations in output, the interest rate, and the
price level; and a is a positive unexplained aggregate—supply shock. We let
*
L(i)=— ai+L,a> 0.
Loan supply enters the aggregate supply equation as a proxy for the
availability of "information capital" in the economy (Blinder, 1985; Calomiris
and Hubbard, 1987) and as a measure of the "cost of credit intermediation"
(Bernanke, 1981, 1983). In Calomiris and Hubbard (1986), we find evidence for
the importance of bank loan supply in generating business cycles during the
period considered here. We also find that loan supply is a gative function
of the low—risk commercial paper rate, which is consistent with the multiple—
markets approach to credit allocation described in Calomiris and Hubbard
(1987).
















Ifs2 > d3, price shocks will be expansionary. As long as d1 > s1a, then
*
shocksto 1,0,andL will be reflected in negative co—movements between
output and the interest rate.
The approach outlined above suggests that, even in an environment of
flexible prices, shocks to aggregate supply and demand —whichduring this
period certainly include deflationary shocks and other shocks to "information
capital" —willlead to co—movements in the interest rate and income. This
provides an alternative to the sticky—price, IS—shock interpretation of
negative co—movements between the interest rate and income posited in equation


























































































































































































































































































































































































Price ratio: sugar Id1w


































(AR( 1) and ML(2)?dels
Partial Partial
AutocorrelationsAutocorrelatjonsAutocorrelatjonsAutocorrelatjons
Lags MA(2) MA(2) AR(1) AR(1)
1 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04
2 0.02 0.02 —0.04 —0.05
3 0.04 0.04 —0.04 —0.03
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 —0.10 —0.10 —0.11 —0.12
6 —0.03 —0.03 —0.03 —0.02
7 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
8 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
9 —0.07 —0.07 —0.08 —0.08
10 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
11 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04
12 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08Table 3
Trends in Transport Coat
Palrplay
Transport Cost Deflated
Year Index Wholesale Price Index Transport Cost
1880 6.25 1.00 6.25
85 5.00 0.85 5.88
90 5.35 0.81 6.60
95 3.50 0.72 4.86
1900 4.63 0.85 5.45
05 3.00 0.89 3.37
10 2.44 1.02 2.39
Sources: See Data Appendix.T
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